

Kissinger Watch

issue #7 11 June, 2002

About This Issue

Dear readers,

First a technical announcement. As of this issue we shall send out only plain text e-mails to avoid overburdening your e-mail boxes. Additionally, you can find each issue on our website, both as plain text version with hyperlinks and as a formatted and more readable pdf version.

East Timor's celebration of its first independence day and the visit of an official US delegation have triggered a debate about the US role in the genocidal occupation of East Timor by Suharto's Indonesia. While most US American newspapers have downplayed the US role, calling the approval of and support for the intervention and occupation a "mistake", the International Herald Tribune (IHT) published a remarkable article highlighting the US complicity in the murder of about 200,000 East Timorese in violation of the US law (article 1). The article was not picked up by the co-sponsors of the IHT - the Washington

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1. How U.S. Averted Gaze When Indonesia Took East Timor

International Herald Tribune
May 20, 2002

East Timorese leaders say that they are grateful to have the backing of the world's most powerful nation. But they are also painfully aware how lack of U.S. support in 1975 helped to encourage the Indonesian takeover.

By Michael Richardson, International Herald Tribune

DILI, East Timor When East Timor celebrates its first day of independence Monday after more than 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule and 24 years of Indonesian occupation, a group of envoys from the United States led by former President Bill Clinton and including several serving and retired senior U.S. officials will be prominent among dozens of foreign delegations offering support to the new government.

East Timorese leaders say that they are grateful to have the backing of the world's most powerful nation as they struggle to build a viable economic future and as relations with their giant neighbor, Indonesia, remain uneasy.

But they are also painfully aware how lack of U.S. support in 1975 helped to encourage the Indonesian takeover. Indeed, some critics of American policy say that the United States has a moral debt to East Timor that will hard to repay.

John Miller, the media coordinator of the East Timor Action Network in New York, which was set up more than a decade ago to publicize East Timor's independence struggle in the United States, said that when Clinton congratulates the East Timorese on their hard-won victory, "we must remember that as the most important supporter of Indonesia's illegal occupation, the United States owes the new country an enormous moral debt."

If President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had not given their approval for Indonesia to invade East Timor in 1975, Miller said, tremendous suffering could have been avoided.

Although Kissinger long denied it, declassified U.S. documents released in December prove that he and Ford, during a visit to Jakarta on Dec. 6, 1975, gave President Suharto of Indonesia a green light to send his military into East Timor. Suharto did so the next day, after the U.S. president and his secretary of state had left Indonesia.

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Post and the New York Times...

In this issue we also reprint the statement of Representative Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH) (article 2) as well as a press release by East Timor *Action* Network spokesman and KissingerWatch co-editor John Miller (article 3).

An issue we have not touched upon in our bulletin but elaborated by Christopher Hitchens in various writings is the Cyprus partition. A new book "The secret Kissinger archives: The decision for partition" was presented in New York in mid-May and lawsuits against Kissinger are being currently prepared (see article 4).

We also wish to draw your attention to the Horman Case in Santiago de Chile (article 5 & Radio Programme; article 6) as well as an article on Kissinger's consultancy role in Argentina (article 7). We will endeavour to provide more information and analysis on his worldwide consultancy activities in future issues.

Last but not least we publish an article on Taiwan and the recently released transcripts of Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing (article 8).

We continue to be delighted by your positive feedback as well as your active support.

Since the launch of Kissinger Watch 3 months ago our website has had more than 35000 hits from more than 50 countries.

Thanks for your readership

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Kissinger Watch

www.icai-online.org/kissingerwatch
a joint project of:

East-Timor *Action* Network
(www.etan.org)

International Campaign against Impunity
(www.icai-online.org)

Instituto Cono Sur
(<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicaconosur/>)

Averted Gaze—continued from page 1

Moreover, many of the weapons used in the invasion were supplied by the United States, contravening a congressional ban on Indonesia's use of American military equipment for anything but defensive operations.

According to the U.S. State Department record of the Dec. 6 meeting, Suharto assured Ford and Kissinger that Indonesia had extensive support in East Timor and that there would probably be only "a small guerrilla war" following the intervention.

"We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action," Suharto reportedly said.

"We will understand and will not press you on the issue," Ford replied.

Kissinger said that while Indonesia should appreciate that the use of U.S.-made arms could create problems, "it depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self-defense or is a foreign operation."

He added: "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return."

An estimated 20,000 Indonesian troops were deployed in East Timor by the end of December in an operation marked by frequent bungling and brutality. In 1979, three years after Jakarta formally annexed East Timor as an Indonesian province, the U.S. Agency for International Development estimated that 300,000 East Timorese - nearly half the population - had been uprooted and moved into camps controlled by the Indonesian armed forces.

By 1980, the operation had left more than 100,000 dead from military action, starvation or disease, with some estimates running as high as 230,000.

Washington's initial response to the invasion of East Timor was to delay new arms sales to Indonesia pending an administrative review by the State Department, ostensibly to determine whether Jakarta had violated the bilateral agreement stipulating that U.S.-supplied arms could only be used for defensive purposes. But military equipment already in the pipeline continued to flow, and during the six-month review period, the United States made four new offers of military equipment sales to Indonesia. They included maintenance and spare parts for the Rockwell OV-10 Bronco aircraft, designed specifically for counterinsurgency operations and used by the Indonesian military in East Timor.

The administrative delay and the subsequent offers were the subject of a meeting on Dec. 18, 1975, between Kissinger and his advisers in which he chastised his staff for writing a memo recommending that arms sales to Indonesia be cut off because Jakarta had violated the end-use agreement.

Miller said that for the next 23 years, from Ford to Clinton, successive U.S. administrations consistently backed Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, providing Jakarta with diplomatic cover as well as billions of dollars in weapons, military training and economic assistance.

Only after the Indonesian military fired on a peaceful political protest in Dili in November 1991, killing and wounding dozens of East Timorese in an incident filmed and reported by foreign journalists, did the U.S. Congress block some weapons sales and military training for Indonesia.

How did such a situation come about? For Kissinger and other senior U.S. officials in 1975, the fate of post-colonial East Timor paled in comparison to Washington's strategic interests in Indonesia, by far the largest nation in Southeast Asia and an anti-Communist bastion. Following the Communist victory in Vietnam in April 1975, fears were rife among non-Communist countries in Southeast Asia that they could be the next victims of armed insurgency.

In East Timor, Portugal had begun a decolonization process, and the leftist Fretilin party - Fretilin is the Portuguese acronym for the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor - had emerged victorious from a brief civil war with its pro-Indonesian opponents in the summer of 1975. The outbreak of civil war disrupted Portuguese plans for orderly decolonization, prompting its officials to retreat from Dili to the offshore island of Atauro. In effect, Portugal abandoned East Timor.

Hard-liners in the Indonesian military expressed fears that an independent East Timor could be used as a base for Communist subversion in Southeast Asia or to spur secessionist movements in Indonesia.

In the autumn of 1975, they intensified military and propaganda operations against East Timor, prompting Fretilin to make a unilateral declaration of independence on Nov. 28, apparently in the belief that a sovereign state would have greater success in appealing for help from the United Nations.

In a recent interview, East Timor's foreign minister, Jose Ramos-Horta, who was Fretilin's foreign affairs spokesman at the time, said that the civil war and the independence declaration both played into the hands of those in Indonesia who wanted to invade.

"The unilateral declaration of independence was an act of desperation, essentially forced upon the leadership of Fretilin in the face of abandonment by everybody," he said.

Japan, the main aid donor and investor in Indonesia, sat on its hands. So did Australia.

"The major powers - the United States, the Soviet Union and China - either acquiesced in Indonesia's action or were not prepared to do anything to stop it," said Richard Woolcott, a former head of Australia's Foreign Ministry. "I think that the Suharto government assessed that very correctly." Woolcott, who was Australian ambassador to Jakarta at the time, said that none of the anti-Communist members of ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, wanted to see a left-leaning independent ministate emerge in the middle of the Indonesian archipelago.

"They were worried they might have a Southeast Asian Cuba on their hands," he said. "ASEAN itself was Kissinger Watch....."

just in its formative stages and was worried by the threat of Communism in Vietnam. It seems very fanciful now, but in 1975 it wasn't so fanciful." Still, critics say that Kissinger's liberty with the truth about his role in East Timor in 1975 has been breathtaking. For example, Kissinger said when asked at a public meeting in New York City in July 1995 about the talks he and Ford had with Suharto in Jakarta on the eve of the Indonesian invasion, that "Timor was never discussed with us when we were in Indonesia." Kissinger added that "at the airport as we were leaving, the Indonesians told us that they were going to occupy the Portuguese colony of Timor." "To us that did not seem like a very significant event because the Indians had occupied the Portuguese colony of Goa 10 years earlier and to us it looked like another process of decolonization," he said.

Christopher Hitchens, author of "The Trial of Henry Kissinger," a highly critical biography of the former secretary of state and Nobel peace laureate, said that Kissinger had much to answer for over East Timor.

"Ford may have been an abject moron, but Kissinger was a professional," Hitchens said. "He knew perfectly well that a colony of a NATO country could not be invaded and occupied except in flat defiance of every international covenant and principle. He also knew that U.S. law explicitly forbade the use of U.S. weapons for such a purpose."

The formerly secret State Department telegram on the Ford-Kissinger talks with Suharto on Dec. 6, 1975, and the other new material on the U.S. role in the Indonesian invasion of East Timor were published by the National Security Archive, an independent nongovernmental research institute and library at George Washington University in Washington. The archive collects and publishes declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act.

William Burr and Michael Evans, who compiled the documents and put them in context, noted that both Ford and Kissinger, in their respective memoirs, had brushed very lightly over East Timor. Kissinger's book "Years of Renewal," which spans the period 1974 to 1976, does not have a single reference to East Timor in more than 1,000 pages. Burr and Evans wrote that important as the U.S. bilateral relationship with Indonesia was, "Jakarta's brutal suppression of the independence movement in East Timor was a development that neither Ford nor Kissinger wanted

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people to remember about their time in power.”

Ramos-Horta is more charitable. Both he and East Timor’s new president, Xanana Gusmao, a former guerrilla leader imprisoned by Indonesia, have met with Kissinger several times in the last 18 months in the United States in their attempts to build American support for an independent East Timor.

2. Statement of Representative Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH) In favor of H Con Res 405 - regarding East Timor

May 21, 2002

Mr. Speaker,

I rise in support of H. Con. Res 405, an act which congratulates the people of East Timor on the occasion of their national independence and establishes official U.S. relations with the new country.

We, in the United States, should take proper account of the enormous accomplishment East Timor independence represents, and with great humility, honestly recognize America’s role in the suppression of East Timor.

The United States government was not a reliable ally of the Timorese independence cause. Quite the opposite, in fact. The United States government consistently sided against the East Timorese people. Recently declassified documents reveal that Secretary of State Kissinger gave the go ahead to Indonesia’s then-President Suharto to invade East Timor in 1975. The United States furnished Indonesia with about 90 percent of its military hardware. Over the course of the next 23 years, Indonesia occupied East Timor, and the United States continued to furnish arms and provide training to Indonesia. In all, more than 200,000 East Timorese were murdered by the Indonesian military during the occupation. The proportional scale of the killing was without rival in the 20th century. One-third of the East Timorese population was murdered. Unfortunately, in the name of anti-communism, then later global stability, the United States abetted mass murder.

Apart from official Washington, the American people have been a reliable friend of the East Timorese. Americans established the East Timor Action Network, participated in Peace Brigades International, dedicated their personal savings through individual foundations and trusts - all with the goal of helping the East Timorese people overcome great odds. Americans gathered in living rooms and lecture halls throughout the country to learn the truths about the oppression of East Timor; they demonstrated on sidewalks and lobbied their Congress, they met with newspaper editors and other journalists in order to bring out the truth; and a few brave Americans sacrificed their personal safety in East Timor to shed light on the reality of Indonesian government oppression.

Constructive change in U.S. policy came in late 1999, after the East Timorese had voted for independence, and after the Indonesian military invaded again to punish the

people for daring to choose independence. Over 2,000 East Timorese were killed, and a large share of the population was forcibly relocated to refugee camps in Indonesia. But the impact of the American people and the confluence of world events finally forced a change in U.S. policy. The effect was dramatic. The U.S. barred Indonesia from further purchases of weapons and training, and immediately the Indonesian Government withdrew from East Timor and permitted international peacekeepers to enter. This demonstrates the importance and effectiveness of withholding U.S. military support from anti-democratic governments that oppress their people

The United States government has a moral debt to repay the East Timorese people. I consider today’s Concurrent Resolution as a very modest down payment on that debt. We should faithfully make the next installments. We should start with generous, unconditional financial grants to the newly independent government of East Timor for healthcare, education, rural reconstruction, refugee resettlement, reconciliation and conflict resolution, environmental protection and the judicial system. The United States should further use its influence with international financial institutions to guarantee Timorese sovereignty and, in a departure from IFI practice, permit the Timorese to design and implement their own economic policies as they see fit. This is the least the United States can do. Let us repay our moral debt to the East Timorese people fully and expeditiously.

3. Clinton Heads to East Timor for Independence Day - ETAN Urges History Not Be Forgotten

John M. Miller, 718-5967668; mobile: 917-690-4391

As Bill Clinton leads the U.S. delegation to East Timor’s independence celebration, the East Timor Action Network (ETAN) urged that the history of U.S. support for Indonesia’s military occupation of East Timor not be forgotten. On May 20, East Timor will become the first new nation of the millennium.

“When former President Clinton, joined by his last ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, congratulates the East Timorese people on their hard-won victory, we must remember that as the most important supporter of Indonesia’s illegal occupation, the U.S., owes the new country an enormous moral debt. We urge the Clinton delegation to acknowledge it,” said John M. Miller, spokesperson for ETAN.

“If President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger had not given the go ahead for Indonesia’s invasion in 1975, tremendous suffering could have been avoided,” added Miller.

As detailed in declassified documents recently released by the National Security Archive, on December 6, 1975, then-U.S. President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger gave Indonesian dictator Suharto a green light to invade

East Timor, which his military did the next day. The U.S. supplied 90 percent of the weapons used during the invasion. For the next twenty-three years, from Ford to Clinton, successive U.S. administrations consistently backed Indonesia's occupation, providing Jakarta diplomatic cover and billions of dollars in weaponry, military training, and economic assistance. More than 200,000 people — one-third of the population — were killed as a result.

When video footage and photographs of a November 1991 massacre in Dili, the capital, were smuggled to the outside world by reporters who survived the bloodbath, international support for East Timor's independence grew dramatically. Following the massacre, the newly-formed East Timor Action Network successfully worked with members of Congress to block some weapons sales and military training to Jakarta.

In the aftermath of East Timor's overwhelming vote for independence on August 30, 1999, the Indonesian military (TNI) and its militia proxies laid waste to the territory, killing at least 2,000 and forcibly displacing more than two-thirds of the population. Through intelligence intercepts and press reports, the Clinton administration was aware of Jakarta's plans to engage in such terror but failed to threaten a cut off of American economic and military aid as a preventative measure. It never issued a presidential statement warning of repercussions if Indonesia did not comply with obligations to ensure security for the U.N. ballot.

A week into the TNI's scorched-earth campaign, Clinton belatedly cut military assistance and other aid to Indonesia. The Indonesian military quickly agreed to withdraw and allow in international peacekeepers.

"Grassroots and congressional pressure did force the executive branch to make significant concessions on its Indonesia policy," said Miller. "The U.S. supported the 1999 referendum and since September 1999 Washington has provided significant assistance to East Timor's reconstruction, but such aid does not begin to compensate the East Timorese people for the suffering wrought by 24 years of U.S. support for Indonesian military occupation."

"The U.S. government must declassify and release all relevant information needed to help the people of the U.S., Indonesia and East Timor understand what happened during the invasion and occupation," said Miller. "We urge Congress to investigate the U.S. role, in order to avoid repeating policies like those which caused such suffering in East Timor."

For over a decade, the East Timor Action Network/U.S. (ETAN) has supported self-determination and human rights for East Timor. It now works to support human dignity for the people of East Timor by advocating for democracy, sustainable development, social, legal, and economic justice and human rights, including women's rights.

Spokespeople for ETAN are available for interviews (call 718-596-7668).

For additional information see ETAN's web site (<http://www.etan.org>).

Kissinger Watch

4. New Book: "The secret Kissinger archives: The decision for partition"

<http://www.cypria.com/frame.html?url=http://www.phileleftheros.com/>

see also: <http://www.greekembassy.org/press/newsflash/2002/April/nflash0427f.html>

17 May 2002

The first presentation of the new book "The secret Kissinger archives: The decision for partition" in the United States was held yesterday at the Cultural Center of the Greek Orthodox Church in Astoria, New York in the presence of Apostolos Kaklamanis, Chairman of the Greek Parliament currently on an official visit.

In his address, Michalis Ignatiou, co-author of the book and US correspondent for the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, said that the book came about as a result of his personal quest to understand what lapsed in Cyprus during the six day period from 15 – 20 July 1974. Michalis Ignatiou said that the conclusion of the book is that the former Secretary of State shoulders all the responsibility for the tragedy, that he planned the partition and supervised the implementation of his plan, and appears to enjoy the tragedy according to the documents presented in the book.

Michalis Ignatiou said that Kissinger's actions violated the US Constitution and for this reason many organizations throughout the world are fighting to hold him accountable for his actions. He stated that two lawyers in Greece and Cyprus have already decided to represent individuals who will file lawsuits against Kissinger, while a similar effort is now underway in Washington.

Officials present at the book presentation included Adamantios Vasilakis, ambassador of Greece to the UN, Yorgos Cassoulides, deputy ambassador of Cyprus to the UN, Vasilis Filippou, Consul of Cyprus in New York, and Bishop Vikentios, representative of Archbishop Demetrios.

5. Letter From Santiago

By Marc Cooper

The Nation June 3, 2002

I arrived here in Chile May 8 as a material witness in a criminal complaint against former dictator Gen. Augusto Pinochet for the murder of an American friend just days after the 1973 coup. But by the time the week was over, I found myself giving face-to-face testimony against one of the former top officials of the US Embassy in Chile and—in effect—against former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

The last time I had seen former US Consul General Fred Purdy was on the morning of September 17, 1973, when I and a handful of other young Americans living here at the time stood nervously outside his office and pleaded with him for some sort of US protection. Six days earlier General Pinochet's military had seized power, declared a state of internal war and unleashed a ferocious and bloody spasm of terror and murder. But a gruff, impatient and profane Purdy

snubbed our plea and literally pushed us back into the chaotic streets, telling us we had nothing to fear from the new military regime—and that the US embassy could and would do nothing for us.

We would soon learn that at about the same hour we were begging Purdy for help, a truckload of Chilean troops had kidnapped our fellow American Charlie Horman from his home a few miles away. Within forty-eight hours Horman was summarily and secretly executed. As memorialized in the 1982 Costa-Gavras film *Missing*, his body wasn't found for another month, and his killers were never identified. Within days of Horman's execution, another young American friend, Frank Teruggi, was also seized and murdered by Chilean forces. And Chile was plunged into the seventeen-year nightmare of Pinochet's military dictatorship that stamped out at least 3,000 other lives and sent nearly a million into exile.

Purdy has never admitted he was wrong, and it's likely he still believes he never made a mistake. US policy-makers from Henry Kissinger in the 1970s to Otto Reich, George W. Bush's top man on Latin America, have always been quicker to praise Pinochet for his fealty to American-style free-market economics than to condemn him for his butchery.

Now, however, Judge Juan Guzmán Tapia—the courageous Chilean magistrate who last year indicted Pinochet on kidnapping and murder charges—is helping set the historical record straight. At the behest of Charlie Horman's widow, Joyce, Judge Guzmán opened a formal criminal probe into the circumstances of Horman's death, including any US role. As a witness in Judge Guzmán's chambers for three days, I was asked to confirm under oath that in the wake of the military takeover, Purdy and the embassy turned their back on Americans in need—especially Americans thought to have been sympathetic to Socialist President Salvador Allende, deposed in the coup.

Under Chile's arcane Napoleonic legal system, Purdy, who now lives in Santiago, was subpoenaed for a *careo*—forced to be personally confronted by me in the presence of the judge. Purdy, now 73, may be visibly aged but he is the same truculent functionary I remember from that morning twenty-nine years ago. His objections to my testimony were loud enough to be heard by others in the waiting room outside the judge's chambers. He vociferously argued that he had done everything possible to save American lives in the aftermath of the coup and that Horman could not be rescued, primarily because he had never sought the help of the embassy. In recent declarations to the Chilean press, Purdy had claimed—with no substantiation—that Horman might have been picked up because he was friendly with an armed ultraleft group. So here we were, back to 1973. According to Purdy, honest people had nothing to fear from the Chilean military.

But Judge Guzmán was clear. "I have to tell you, Mr. Purdy," he said calmly, "there are indications you were involved in a cover-up and that you have not been fully forthcoming with the investigation." Judge Guzmán then officially declared Purdy *inculpa*—a "suspect"—in his Kissinger Watch

investigation.

Thus Purdy becomes the first former US official to face possible criminal penalties in a case arising from the 1973 Chilean coup.

Infuriated by the judge's ruling, Purdy stomped from the chambers and angrily confronted a waiting *claque* of courthouse reporters. With TV cameras rolling, Purdy—pressed to explain his behavior in 1973—grabbed a reporter by the arm and shouted in an odd Spanish-English mix, "Momen-fucking-tito!" Purdy's indignation, featured prominently in Chilean newscasts, takes us to the moral center of this story. Purdy was shocked that a US official might actually be held responsible in a foreign court for crimes perpetrated by US policy. The obscure Purdy is now an important symbol in the quest for international justice. If the "Pinochet principle" established that former heads of state lack immunity from human rights violations, then so do ex-consuls general.

Purdy was caught in Guzmán's net only because he retired here and could not escape a Chilean subpoena. But Guzmán's bigger targets are sixteen other former US officials, including US Ambassador to Chile Nathaniel Davis and Kissinger. More than a year ago, Guzmán requested that Washington make these officials available. Only by questioning them can anyone begin to answer key questions like what the US government did or did not know about the murder of its own citizens and to what degree functionaries like Purdy were following a State Department line of cover-up for the Pinochet junta. So far Washington hasn't responded to Guzmán's request. Kissinger told a British audience in late April that while "it is quite possible mistakes were made," a certain number of errors are inevitable and "the issue is whether, thirty years after the event, the courts are the appropriate means by which determination is made."

Some pieces of the Horman puzzle that have emerged from thousands of pages of recently declassified documents indeed point to some level of US involvement. "There is some circumstantial evidence to suggest US intelligence may have played an unfortunate part in Horman's death," reads one State Department memo, obtained by the National Security Archive. "At best it was limited to providing or confirming information that helped motivate his murder by the GOC [government of Chile]. At worst, US intelligence was aware that GOC saw Horman in a rather serious light and US officials did nothing to discourage the logical outcome of GOC paranoia."

The Chileans might have been paranoid, but Washington was coldly calculating. The Nixon Administration found it more compelling to support Pinochet's regime than to fully investigate and solve the murder of its own citizens. In early 1974, shortly after Horman and Teruggi's bodies had been found and Pinochet's blood orgy was rising to fever pitch, the State Department official in charge of Latin America, Jack Kubisch, had a private meeting with then-Chilean Foreign Minister Adm. Ismael Huerta. A confidential US Embassy cable to the State Department reports that in that meeting "Kubisch raised this subject [of Horman's murder]

in the context of the need to be careful to keep relatively small issues in our relationship from making our cooperation more difficult.”

The multilingual Judge Guzmán exudes erudite refinement. The son of a well-known poet, bearded and partial to blazers and regimental ties, Guzmán seems more the country squire than crusading magistrate. But his patience and polish, his deliberate even-temperedness, have led not only to indictments of the once-untouchable Pinochet but also of fifty-five other Chilean officers. As he ushered me into his chambers, he stopped first to shake the hands of several suspect former and active police officials he had cited who were waiting in an adjacent room. “Sometimes it is very difficult to have to treat these men you know are criminals and murderers as gentlemen,” he said. “But that’s why we have laws to punish them.”

In accord with those laws, Guzmán says that if the United States doesn’t act soon on his request to gather testimony from Kissinger and other US officials, he’ll have no choice but to file for their extradition to Chile. Kissinger could satisfy Guzmán’s request by testifying before a US judge, who would ask the questions Guzmán wants answered. Guzmán doesn’t want to indict Kissinger; he only wants to hear his testimony on these supposedly “relatively small issues.” But there’s a better way: Kissinger should get on a plane to Santiago and spend a few hours with the judge to help clear up these crimes. And he can be sure that Judge Guzmán will, at all times, treat him strictly as a gentleman.

6. BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE / Democracy NOW! May 2002

Listen to the program online: <http://www.webactive.com/pacifica/demnow/dn20020510.html>

The Bush administration this week took the unprecedented step of “unsigned” the treaty setting up the world’s first permanent war crimes tribunal.

But the march for justice for the victims of crimes against humanity continues. It continues in the International Criminal Court that will be established on July 1, in spite of the US. And it goes on in the numerous specific cases that have been brought against murderous dictators and governments. It is these cases that have created the legal space in which to establish an international criminal court.

In one of the most landmark cases, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon charged Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet with numerous human rights crimes and ordered him arrested in 1998 in England.

Pinochet had for years eluded responsibility for the deaths, disappearance, and torture of thousands of Chileans. Pinochet remained under house arrest for 16 months while the British debated his fate. In the end, English officials decided Pinochet could not be extradited to Spain because of his ill health, and allowed him to return to Chile. But once in Chile, officials stripped Pinochet of his

immunity, opening the door for his prosecution at home.

There are now more than 100 cases pending in Chile against Pinochet.

Well, today Judge Garzon joins us in the studio.

Guests:

- Judge Baltasar Garzon, Investigating Judge of Spain’s National Court.
- Michelle Guanica, translator.
- Jennifer Harbury, human rights lawyer and wife of slain Guatemalan rebel leader, Efraim Bamaca Velazquez. She is the author of *Searching for Everardo*, about her quest to find out the truth about her husband’s disappearance.
- Joyce Horman, widow of journalist-human rights activist Charles Horman. Charles Horman was seized by Chilean troops just days after the bloody coup ousting the Chilean leader, Salvador Allende. He was then taken to the National Stadium and killed. Joyce Horman sued Henry Kissinger in 1976 for \$4.9 million and information on the murder of her husband. Over time, bits and pieces have come out, and a picture has emerged of an ugly conspiracy to silence her husband for his knowledge of U.S. involvement in the coup as well as in the ambush killing of Constitutionalist General Rene Schneider. As told in the 1982 film “Missing,” Horman had only recently completed his research into the U.S. role in Schneider’s killing when he was kidnapped off the street in front of neighbors in September 1973.

7. Argentina Crying Over ‘Hired Guns’

Insight Magazine

Issue Date: May 27, 2002

<http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=252771>

By Martin Edwin Andersen

Secretary of State Colin Powell’s recent warning to a cash-starved Argentina that underlying economic reform is a necessary but insufficient ingredient for sustained economic growth was followed by a stern admonishment. “Argentina,” he said, “must also address the underlying political and institutional flaws that encourage excess public-sector borrowing, corruption, politicized judicial systems and a lack of transparency in government activities.”

Observers in Buenos Aires were left to wonder whether those warnings on corruption and transparency in government activities might extend to various well-known American political consultants and lobbyists plying their trade along the Río de la Plata. If past is prologue, these informal U.S. representatives may provide unseemly examples of public rectitude, Powell’s pointed warning notwithstanding.

Powell’s comments came just weeks after it was revealed that the Argentine government of Eduardo

Duhalde, the hapless populist desperate for outside help to patch up his country's tattered reputation for international creditworthiness, had hired a trio of Washington power-houses as registered agents. One was Alan Stoga, head of Zemi Communications of New York and a protégé of Nixon secretary of state Henry Kissinger. Kissinger currently is of interest to Argentine prosecutors for his alleged role in egregious human-rights violations committed in South America during the 1970s (see "Kissinger Had a Hand in 'Dirty War,'" KW #1).

Aging and ailing Larry Eagleburger, secretary of state in the George H.W. Bush administration and a founding partner in Kissinger's original lobbying firm, Kissinger Associates, also was hired by a Duhalde desperately in need of vigorous defenders. So was Bill Clinton's former deputy treasury secretary, the ubiquitous Stuart Eizenstadt.

The ensuing flap over the hiring of such consultants was just one in a growing series of ironies visited upon angry and weary Argentines. Most of the estimated 20,000 people kidnapped and secretly killed a quarter-century ago by a military junta actively supported by Kissinger came from Duhalde's own Péronist Party. Kissinger's former patron, U.S. banker David Rockefeller, reportedly helped the generals run up Argentina's foreign debt; now Duhalde was turning to two of "Mr. K's" former top lieutenants for financial advice.

As desperation over the economic cataclysm and endless political wrangling grows in Buenos Aires — combined with a perceived lack of sympathy by Washington to the country's plight — local observers recall that the kleptocratic government of Carlos Saul Menem, for whom Duhalde served as vice president, had been hailed by the George H.W. Bush administration and again during the eight years of Bill Clinton. Then, these observers note, U.S. officials turned a blind eye as drug trafficking and money laundering skyrocketed in Argentina. (The difference between Menem and Duhalde, says one critical political observer in Buenos Aires, mirrors that between Vito and Michael Corleone in the movie *The Godfather*. In Argentina, he added, Menem plays the role of the more modern, but no less unappealing, son.)

The consultant controversy also comes as Latins are wondering just how much bragging rights the gringos legitimately can claim in the post-Enron period to the mantle of clean government. According to a poll of Buenos Aires residents released May 14 by the respected Ricardo Rouvier & Asociados public-opinion firm, 56.4 percent of Argentines rejected Powell's assertions, claiming that they were both interventionist and coming from a country "with little moral authority" to make them.

"The Enron scandal," complained Joaquin Estefania in the Spanish newspaper *El Pais*, "with its creative accounting, revolving door between the political and economic establishments, fraud against stockholders and workers, etc., shows that crony capitalism isn't just the province of emerging or developing countries, as we have been told, but is at the heart of the system itself."

Although the lucrative contracts given to Stoga, Eagleburger and Eizenstadt raised eyebrows in a country experiencing unprecedented economic hardship, they were just the latest in a string of services purchased from high-flying U.S. "hired guns" that in the last decade have traveled to Argentina to do business. The conduct of several of these has not, observers say, suggested the strict adherence to transparency and clean government urged on Argentines by Powell.

Questions about the role played in Buenos Aires by U.S. political consultants, former diplomats and lobbyists grew during the 1990s. This particularly was so after Miami businessman Howard Glick, a longtime fundraiser for then-Vice President Al Gore, was indicted and later convicted for violations of U.S. campaign-finance laws, including soliciting a contribution from a foreign national. Glick, vice chairman for finance of the Democratic National Committee in 1996, was a frequent visitor to Buenos Aires. With U.S. Ambassador James Cheek as his host, Glick banded about his ties to Thomas "Mack" McLarty, Clinton's top adviser on Latin America and Kissinger's current business partner.

Meanwhile, friends of former president George H.W. Bush, including several retired intelligence officials, parlayed their ties to the former U.S. chief executive into business contacts in Argentina. Questions also were raised when — after Bush's ambassador to Buenos Aires, Terrance Todman, was appointed to the board of the recently privatized Argentine state airline, a symbol of corruption during the Menem government — Clinton appointee Cheek signed on as a director of an engraving and printing enterprise now under investigation for allegedly forging millions of dollars in provincial bonds. In both cases, questions were raised whether the close bilateral relationship they promoted as envoys to Menem's government resulted in business opportunities after they left U.S. government service.

The 1999 presidential contest in Argentina featured a no-holds-barred sideshow between two former rivals and top Clinton advisers. Dick Morris, forced out of the White House after a toe-sucking dalliance with a prostitute was revealed on the eve of the Democratic National Convention in 1996, signed on as a paid senior campaign adviser to Fernando De la Rúa, the standard-bearer of Menem's political opposition. James Carville advised Duhalde, by then a bitter enemy of Menem's, until the Argentine and the architect of Clinton's 1992 presidential win parted ways midcampaign. Duhalde reportedly was driven to distraction by Carville's penchant for handheld computer games.

De la Rúa, heading a clean-government coalition, won the contest in a landslide. But the glow of victory by the Morris candidate over the man backed by Carville proved short-lived. Despite the election's mandate for change, De la Rúa proved indecisive, and surrounded himself with bumbling loyalists. Worse, a government-sponsored labor-reform law won Argentine congressional approval following reported widespread bribery using secret funds from the

state intelligence agency, SIDE.

De la Rúa's own vice president resigned in protest. In a subsequent media fracas known as "Morrisgate" in November 2000, the Argentine newsmagazine Noticias alleged that Morris received at least some of a \$1.6 million contract for advising the De la Rúa government for eight months. The magazine claimed Morris had been paid through IKON, a lobbying firm owned by his friend, controversial Republican campaign strategist Roger Stone. It also reported that the contract, for "image consulting," was signed by SIDE chief Fernando de Santibanes.

The revelations spurred Argentine federal judge Jorge Urso to raid the presidential palace and the state intelligence headquarters as part of an ongoing investigation into corruption by the "reformist" De la Rúa administration. The local press began to ask why a contract that purportedly dealt only with "image consulting" was obtained from SIDE.

In a statement to Insight, Morris said, "The contract was with SIDE because that is how de la Rúa thought it could best be handled financially." Morris says he did not receive "a dime" from the contract with SIDE that he procured for his friend Stone, who in November 2000 reportedly agreed to pay \$100,000 in fines if the New York Lobbying Commission did not find him and others guilty of violating lobbying rules. According to PRWeek magazine, the IKON-SIDE contract was canceled in early 2001.

In a telephone interview with Insight, the Buenos Aires magistrate says his probe into the SIDE contract is continuing. Morris, he says, is one of those under investigation. For his part, Morris notes that the judiciary in Argentina is "notoriously political" and adds that he never has been contacted by the magistrate or asked to testify or furnish any information in the case. "The fact remains," he says, "that all this was pro bono on my part with no direct or indirect compensation. No good deed goes unpunished."

De la Rúa's term in office was cut short in December 2001 after the country's economy went into a free fall. He eventually was replaced by his one-time rival Duhalde. One of those who reportedly has Duhalde's ear is former CIA staffer and Reagan-era National Security Council economic adviser Norman Bailey.

The Argentine media reported that in mid-April Bailey spent a morning with Duhalde at the Olivos presidential residence outside Buenos Aires, mapping out a strategy for improving relations with the George W. Bush administration. Insiders say Bailey's access is due, in part, to the fact that he was one of the few who went out of his way to meet with Duhalde in Washington following the latter's stinging defeat by De la Rúa.

During the Reagan years, Bailey came under heavy criticism for cultivating ties to political extremist Lyndon LaRouche and his followers. Even after leaving government service, Bailey was quoted as saying LaRouche had "the best private intelligence services in the world." Among the bizarre theories LaRouche and his followers peddled were that Britain's political leaders were "puppets of Jewish Kissinger Watch.....

banking families," that Queen Elizabeth II headed a drug cartel and that Kissinger was a homosexual as well as a murderer.

In the early 1990s, LaRouche's publications touted as heroes two Latin Americans of special interest. One was ultraright Argentine Col. Mohammed Ali Seineldin, a rabid anti-Semite "Painted Faces" death-squad leader responsible for two rebellions against the elected governments of Menem and his civilian predecessor. The other was Venezuelan army officer Hugo Chavez, the pro-Castro nationalist who currently serves as that country's president (see "Fidel's Successor in Latin America," April 30, 2001). The Duhalde government recently rejected the credentials of Chavez's chosen envoy to Buenos Aires, a sociologist linked to fringe leftist parties and "Painted Faces" partisans in Argentina. According to diplomatic sources, the envoy sought to "sell" the Venezuelan model in the Southern Cone. Meanwhile, disaffected Peronists say they find in Chavez's "nationalist, revolutionary and anti-imperialist" dogma a worldview very close to that of their party's late founder, Gen. Juan D. Peron.

In the aftermath of a coup attempt in Venezuela, whose ties to Washington are denied in ways reminiscent of Clinton's parsing of the definition of sex, Buenos Aires' overheated rumor circuits again are working overtime. This time it was with speculation about the real motives behind the comments of Powell and other administration officials concerning the state of Argentina's democracy. It did not pass without notice that Powell's remarks were made before the annual conference of the Council of the Americas, founded by Rockefeller, one of those who reportedly helped Argentina's military run up the country's crushing debt burden through a series of questionable loans. Among those singled out for recognition by Powell was Stoga, the group's acting president and one of those hired by the supposedly populist Duhalde to help Argentina find its way.

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8. Kissinger transcripts show betrayal of Taiwan / Taiwan Communiqué

<http://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/101-no2.htm>

In a peculiar time warp, at the end of February 2002 there was a dark flashback to the early 1970s when Mr. Kissinger tried to trade away the future of Taiwan without any involvement, representation, or consent of the people of the island.

On 27 February 2002, the National Security Archive at George Washington University in Washington DC release the transcripts of former US national security adviser Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing in 1971 to arrange the summit which eventually led to normalization of US relations with China. The transcripts include the transcript of the meeting on 9-11 July 1971, in which Mr. Kissinger, extensively discussed Taiwan with his Chinese counter-

parts. The transcripts are available at the National Security Archive at the website of GWU at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/>

According to the New York Times (*“Records dispute Kissinger on his `71 Visit to China”*, NYTimes, 28 February 2002) the account of the meeting in the newly released documents contradicts the one that Mr. Kissinger published in his later memoirs. In his *“The White House Years,”* published in 1979, he had written that Taiwan *“was only mentioned briefly”* during the crucial meeting. From these transcripts we now learn that it was a major issue.

During that meeting, Kissinger spent 17 hours in negotiations with then Chinese premier Zhou Enlai from July 9 to July 11, 1971, hammering out details of the Nixon trip and drafting the Shanghai Communiqué. With his willful disregard for the position of the native Taiwanese he laid the seeds for the sheer insurmountable problems which plagued US-Taiwan-China relations over the ensuing three decades.

The records show Kissinger and Zhou discussing Taiwan’s future without any consideration of the views of the people of Taiwan, while Nixon and Kissinger worked hard to make sure their decisions on Taiwan were kept a secret. They also show that Nixon wanted Kissinger to play down the Taiwan issue during the Zhou meetings, but that Kissinger decided to deal with the issue at length. In fact, the transcript shows a prolonged and detailed discussion of

Taiwan, which covered nine of the 45 transcript pages.

In that first meeting, Kissinger volunteered that the US would not support the Taiwan independence movement, would not accept a *“two China”* or *“one China-one Taiwan”* policy and would recognize Taiwan as an *“inalienable part”* of China. He also indicated the US wanted to fully recognize China sometime within the first two years of Nixon’s second term in office.

In the transcripts, both Kissinger and Zhou agreed that the relations with the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan were linked to the war in Vietnam. The US was seeking China’s help in ending the war in exchange for Washington’s switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.

They also worked out a deal on how Beijing would replace the Kuomintang’s seat in the UN — Washington would withdraw its position that the question is an important one, allowing China to be voted into the world body by a simple majority vote. Taipei would be voted out by a two-thirds vote *“as soon as you can get the two-thirds vote for expulsion,”* Kissinger told Zhou. While Washington would complain loudly about the Taiwan ouster, which its UN envoy George Bush did at the time, it would tacitly accept the switch.